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PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN THE US AND EUROPE: EFFICIENCY, SOUNDNESS 
AND CHALLENGES
This article surveys the recent changes in and outlook for wholesale and retail payments in 
Europe and the US. We document a convergence in payments institutions and patterns of 
use, although differences in retail usage remain. 
An overarching theme of our survey is the importance of the differences in regulatory 
structure between the two areas. These differences are both a product of differing initial 
conditions and a catalyst for contrasting responses to current technological challenges. 
The Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA) is a major effort to unify the payment market and 
instruments in Europe, although substantial heterogeneity remains in some payments 
platforms. In the more unified US payment system, centralized programs for payment 
system improvement are much weaker and more preliminary. 
We examine the consequences of this difference on the responses to the most recent 
payment innovations – the so-called fintech revolution. Here the key regulatory challenge is 
to balance the concerns of the traditional providers of payments services within the financial 
industry with the needs of the newcomers, in order to obtain the right tradeoff between 
innovation and safety. 
To those of us who have studied payments and payment systems for a long time, the recent 
popular interest in them is disorienting. Payment arrangements are part of the basic 
“plumbing” of the financial system and are critical to the efficient operation of the system; 
any malfunction can cause significant disruption and instability. Nonetheless, the procedures 
and structures that support payments are typically invisible to final users. Therefore we 
payments researchers are used to yawns in response when we describe our research. 
Now, however, we get pummeled with questions: “What will happen with Bitcoin?”1 of course, 
but also “Are these smart phone payment apps really safe?” “What do I do to protect myself 
from identity theft?” and the perennial “Why are banks charging so much for…?” Dramatic 
advances in technology, worries about safety and stability of the infrastructure, and public 
policy concerns about the competitiveness of the banking industry have converged to bring 
payments and payment systems into to the public’s consciousness. Meanwhile, spurred by 
these same developments, researchers have made enormous progress in the study of 
payments and payment systems both at the theoretical and empirical levels. 
The goal of this paper is to review and compare some of the recent changes in payments 
systems in Europe and the US in the light of this work. Our fundamental questions are 
these: how efficient and how stable are these systems at the wholesale and retail level, and 
what has been the effect of recent technological innovations and policy initiatives on their 
efficiency and soundness?
The article is structured in three sections following this introduction. Section 2 surveys the 
main theoretical advances regarding the structure of retail and wholesale payment systems 
Abstract
1 Introduction
1  And regardless of this interest, we will for the most part not deal with Bitcoin or similar virtual currencies in this 
survey. Despite their increase over the last few years, and the interesting theoretical and technical questions they 
induce, virtual currencies still remain an economically relatively unimportant issue, and their use as a medium of 
payment – as opposed to a speculative investment – is still extremely limited. 
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as well as the recent institutional and regulatory developments in Europe and the US. 
A comparison of the structure of the EU and US payment systems is made in Section 3. 
Section 4 analyses some recent challenges, paying particular attention to the impact of 
fintech. Section 5 concludes.
The peculiarities of its national payment systems and their process of integration into a 
single market make the European case a particularly interesting object of study. Payment, 
clearing and settlement arrangements in Europe have been progressively converging into 
the so-called “single payment area,” with different directives aimed at achieving common 
standards, promoting efficiency, monitoring innovations and protecting final users. 
A growing number of instruments and mechanisms have been developed under common 
standards. If these developments are not effectively managed, significant problems can 
arise from their credit, operational or legal risks.
The US has not had the difficulties of a transition to a unified arrangement. On the other 
hand, greater restrictions in the US on the powers of regulatory authorities to establish or 
enforce standardization or unified solutions has provided its own set of challenges, as 
regulators and government struggle to deal with the conflicting demands of heterogeneous, 
entrenched sectors of the economy. 
For both the US and Europe, the latest challenge is innovation by non-financial institutions 
entering the payments arena, as a part of the so-called “fintech revolution.” The ability of 
these two different regulatory structures to adapt their systems to this new opportunity will 
have a significant impact on their relative economic performance in the coming decades. 
The capacity to make payment is probably the most fundamental piece of infrastructure 
for any economy that has developed beyond the stage of pure barter. In an economy with 
multiple steps of production from raw material to finished product, the value of payment 
is many times the value of GDP; in the US the value of retail payment in 2014 was $203 
trillion while in the Eurozone, it was €143 trillion or about 12 and 14 times respective 
GDPs.2
Because economies are so dependent on payment systems, and the amounts involved are 
so massive, the potential cost of their failure is high. Disruptions to the payments system 
have generally been associated with disruptions to commercial activity, as regularly observed 
in the nineteenth century US and, more recently in Cyprus and in Greece.3 For this reason, 
safety and stability of the payment system is a fundamental concern for financial policy.
Also, because of the size of the payments system, there is a concern that inefficiency in the 
system can act as a drag on economic activity. A report by Schmiedel et al. (2012), suggests 
the costs to society of providing retail payment services can vary between 0.80% and 
1.20% of GDP. Other studies estimated even larger costs, of around 3% of GDP [Humphrey 
et al. (2003)].4 Clearly then reductions in cost can provide real gains to an economy. 
Moreover, the costs of payments services at the retail level are borne unequally: innovations 
in payments services can bring additional economic gains by reducing the burdens on the 
2  The relevance 
of payments in the 
economy and the main 
developments in 
Europe and the US
2.1  RELEVANCE OF PAYMENTS 
TO THE ECONOMY
2  Sources: Federal Reserve and European Central Bank.
3  On the other hand, there have been examples where disruptions to the payments systems have had surprisingly 
minimal effect on economic activity-notably in Ireland [see Norman and Zimmerman (2016)].
4  Other specific country-level studies, show, for example, that in the Netherlands, the total cost of all point-of-
sale (POS) payments was estimated to be 0.65% of GDP in 2002 [Brits and Winder (2005)], while in Belgium was 
0.74% of GDP in 2003 [Banque Nationale de Belgique (2005)].
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poorest segments of the population, although the diffusion of new technologies among the 
most deprived obviously entails its own cost. 
Innovation in payments brings its own set of concerns. Historically, policy makers worried 
about whether the payment system was robust enough to withstand macroeconomic 
shocks faced by the financial institutions that underpinned it. The entry to payments service 
provision by institutions based not in the financial sector, but in the tech and retail sectors, 
might lead to a system less affected by variations on the financial side of the economy. On 
the other hand, any instability could be exacerbated, both by limitations to the financial 
depth of these new players, and by weaknesses in the system at the interface between old 
and new payments systems. Thus the successful integration of the new technologies into 
the existing framework becomes a challenge for payments regulators.
The effect of introduction of new payments providers are mainly a concern for the retail 
portion of the payments landscape. Wholesale payments are undergoing technological 
and institutional changes as well, but on the whole are currently facing few challenges 
from new types of institutional entrants. The challenge there arises from the vast size of the 
system, the fact that the payments processed by any player on a daily basis can be many 
times the value of the player itself and the complexity of the interactions among the 
participants in the network. These issues only become more acute as systems become 
more internationally integrated and interdependent.
In the abstract, all payments are the settlement of obligations through transfer of a mutually 
acceptable medium of exchange. A payments system “that set of arrangements for the 
discharge of the obligations assumed by economic agents whenever they acquire control 
over real or financial resources” [Borio et al. (1992)]. In any such system, the ultimate difficulty 
is in getting the payor to pay what he is supposed to pay. When the payor and payee are 
known to each other and interact repeatedly, very informal procedures can be effective – 
indeed if each of the pair is payor and payee about equally, the maintenance of a “running tab” 
between them may make payment itself unnecessary. However among strangers (or even 
among individuals well known to one another if the stakes become large enough) more formal 
arrangements are necessary. Payment systems are designed to facilitate these transfers. 
Payments arrangements can be divided into store-of-value systems and account-based 
systems: 
Store-of-value systems, such as commodity money, fiat money, and stored 
value cards, are founded on the transfer of some payments object (be it 
coins, notes, or electronic stored value) between payer and payee, and they 
depend critically on a payee’s ability to verify the payments object. Account-
based systems, such as charge accounts, checks, and credit cards, require 
the keeping of accounts in the name of the payer and payee. The success of 
account-based system hinges, most fundamentally, on the ability of its 
participants to verify the identities of account holders, to ascertain the link 
between transactors and histories.5 
Where a payment transaction in a store-of-value system can be arranged between just the 
payor and payee, the transaction in an account-based system involves (at least) three parties: 
2.2 THEORY
5  Kahn and Roberds (2009). The distinction between account based and store-of-value systems was initially observed 
by Green (2004).
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payer, payee and account provider. In other words, since the process takes place on the 
books of the account provider, there has to be a protocol to communicate to the provider that 
the transaction is to take place and a process to confirm to the parties that the transaction 
has taken place.6 
Thus store-of-value systems have traditionally been most useful for small immediate 
payments, relying on the instant recognisability of the medium. Account verification has 
required greater overhead and so has tended to be used more for larger and more delayed 
payments. With declining costs and increasing speed of communications, the account-
based systems have over time moved into the realm once reserved for store-of-value.
At the retail level, security of the system means ensuring that these processes cannot be 
corrupted: that it is difficult for one party to fraudulently initiate or terminate a transaction, 
that once initiated there is a high likelihood that the transaction will proceed to completion, 
and that confirmation of completion is swift and certain. 
At the wholesale level, stability of the system also means ensuring that the transaction 
proceeds smoothly, but the focus shifts to systemic considerations. Although individual 
transactions are large, and the (electronic) safeguards for their integrity are important, 
repeated interactions, sophistication of participants, and ability to standardize procedures, 
make verification of legitimacy of individual transactions less of a problem.7 The greater 
costs from failures of individual transactions arise from the potential for systemic instability. 
In typical large value payments systems, the ability of a financial institution to make its 
obligated payments during the day depends on its ability to receive obligations from other 
institutions as well. Thus a system will be unstable if its design tends to cause individual 
failures to propagate in cascading fashion, and so a major concern for designers of 
payments systems is to ensure that individual payments failures remain isolated. 
Dealing with financial stability issues in payment systems has become more complex 
nowadays with the concurrence of different important market changes. As suggested by 
the governor of the Bank of France, Villeroy de Galhau (2016) these transformations include 
a growing appetite for digital solutions, which has drastically altered consumption 
approaches; the public’s clear mistrust of the banking world in the wake of the financial 
crisis; and the regulatory changes aimed at promoting increased standardization and 
transparency in financial transactions, which have also encouraged more electronic trading.
European regulation
In Europe different legislative initiatives have progressively converged to a more general 
aim: the creation of the so-called Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA), whose goal is a Europe 
where all transactions (domestic and cross-border) offer the same conditions of ease, 
efficiency and security. SEPA covers all EU member states, as well as Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland. SEPA deals with several aspects of efficiency in payments systems, including 
common instruments, standards, procedures and infrastructures. It has focused mainly on 
2.3  RECENT INITIATIVES 
IN THE EU AND THE US
6  One of the most interesting possibilities for the block chain technology that underlies Bitcoin is its adaptation to 
development of account-based systems which eliminate the need for the role of the third-party communication. 
Note that, unlike Bitcoin these applications of block chain technology need not be outside the standard regulatory 
systems; indeed payment systems using them could still operate in and be backed by central bank money.
7  This is not to say that individual transaction failures cannot impose costs on participants in wholesale systems; 
indeed concerns about such costs are a major policy issue in Europe. The recent hack of the Bangladesh Bank’s 
account with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, resulting in a loss of $101 million, show that even central 
banks can be vulnerable to major fraudulent transactions. 
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three payment instruments: credit transfers, direct debits and payment cards. SEPA took 
its first operative steps in January 2008, when SEPA Credit Transfers were put in place, 
enabling credit transfers under homogenous standards within the EU. SEPA Direct Debit 
followed in 2009. 
The European Commission has collaborated with the European Central Bank and all 
central banks in SEPA countries to achieve the goals of SEPA. Coordinated oversight of 
payments systems is fundamental to the common treatment of payments; the legal basis 
for this oversight is set out in the Treaty establishing the European Community and the 
Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the European Central Bank 
(ECB). The Statute mentions that ‘‘the basic tasks to be carried out through the ESCB 
shall be [...] to promote the smooth operation of payment systems […] The ECB and the 
national central banks may provide facilities, and the ECB may make regulations, to 
ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems within the Community and with 
other countries’’. 
The main regulatory initiatives connected with SEPA have been the following:
—  The Payment Services Directive (PSD), on the standardized set of rules 
applicable to all payment services provided in the European Union. 
—  Regulation EC 924/2009 (amended by Regulation 260/2012) that establishes 
equality in the fees charged for domestic and equivalent cross-border 
payments in euro, except for checks.
—  Regulation EC 260/2012, which establishes deadlines for migration to the 
SEPA instruments by setting a series of technical and business requirements 
for credit transfers and direct debits in euro.
Converging to electronic payment standards and creating a single market for payments is 
expected to generate significant cost savings for all market participants. An impact study 
conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) for the European Commission8 summarized 
these estimated benefits after the full completion of SEPA:
—  Potential savings for all stakeholders (corporations, public sector, banks, 
and clearing and settlement mechanisms) of €21.9 billion on a recurring 
annual basis, resulting from price convergence and process efficiency. Part 
of the improvements come from a reduction of up to 9 million bank accounts 
estimated, resulting from more efficient corporate euro cash-management 
infrastructures.
—  €227 billion estimated to be unlocked in credit lines and liquidity. These 
benefits are realized from cash pooling and efficient improvements in 
clearing.
Large companies and small cap companies are expected to enjoy more cost savings from 
SEPA improvements, although the benefits seem to extend also to other firms. Whether 
these benefits will be finally realized or not will depend on the efficiency of the SEPA 
structure and also on the oversight of the system. 
8  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/payments/docs/sepa/140116_study_en.pdf, report dated January 16th, 2014.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 16 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 30
The new channels for retail payment instruments, and in particular the complexities of 
introduction of non-bank players into the payments arena, have stimulated the development 
of legislative and regulatory responses in the EU. As a result, a revised “Payment Services 
Directive” is currently being implemented, dealing specifically with electronic payments in 
Europe and the need to make them more secure and more convenient for European shoppers. 
The PSD2 (technically specified as Directive 2015/2366 of 25 November 2015 on payment 
services in the internal market) was published in the Official Journal of the EU, on 23 
December 2015 and entered into force on 12 January 2016. Member States will have two 
years to introduce the necessary changes in their national laws.
The new rules include strict security requirements for the initiation and processing of 
electronic payments and the protection of consumers’ financial data. PSD2 also envisages 
opening the EU payment market for companies offering consumer or business-oriented 
payment services based on the access to the customer’s payment account – the so called 
“payment initiation services providers” and “account information services providers.” This 
will also make necessary to enhance consumers’ rights in numerous areas, including 
reducing the liability for non-authorised payments, introducing an unconditional (“no 
questions asked”) refund right for direct debits in euro. Another noteworthy novelty of PSD2 
is the prohibition of surcharging (additional charges for the right to pay e.g. with a card) for 
the use of payment instrument for which interchange fees are already regulated. 
Importantly, PSD2 incorporates a list of “categories of payment service providers,” as 
shown in Figure 1. Along with credit institutions, two categories deserve specific definition. 
One is “electronic money institutions” which are those that issue electronic money that can 
be used to fund payment transactions and which should continue to be subject to the 
prudential requirements laid down in Directive 2009/110/EC. The other one is “payment 
institutions,” which are those legal persons that are granted authorisation to provide and 
execute payment services throughout the European Union. Obviously, the same institution 
(e.g. a bank) may also exercise these functions but this definition embraces a large and 
growing number of non-bank providers. As also noted in the preface of PSD2, “while this 
SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration from PSD2 main text.
PAYMENT SERVICES PROVIDED IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER THE APPROVAL OF PSD2 FIGURE 1
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Directive recognises the relevance of payment institutions, credit institutions remain the 
principal gateway for consumers to obtain payment instruments.” This is the case because 
European regulators assume that most payments at the point of sale today are card based, 
even if “the current degree of innovation in the field of payments might lead to the rapid 
emergence of new payment channels in the forthcoming years.” PSD2 specifically opens 
the prudential regime – the single license for all providers of payment services which are not 
connected to taking deposits or issuing electronic money – up to the payment initation 
services providers and the account information services providers.  
US Regulation
The regulatory experience in the US contrasts sharply with that in the EU. In particular, there 
has not been an overarching, systematic program focused on regulation of the payment 
system. This conclusion might be surprising in light of the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Passed in the wake of the financial crisis, and the 
resulting review of US financial infrastructure and its performance, the bill is the most 
comprehensive (and compendious) piece of financial legislation ever enacted in the US. 
Among its many provisions are those setting up new financial authorities – in particular a 
systemic risk regulator (the “Financial Stability Oversight Council”) and a consumer protection 
structure devoted to financial products (the “Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection”), and 
providing additional powers and responsibilities to existing authorities – notably the 
extensions of the powers of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as an authority for 
resolving failed institutions. Provisions were made for changing the regulatory environment 
for deposit insurance, for over-the-counter derivatives, for hedge funds, for credit-rating 
agencies, for insurance companies and for executive compensation in financial institutions. 
Despite all of this, the attention paid in the act to the payments system was relatively mild. 
Within the Dodd-Frank legislation, the “Durbin Amendment” requires the Federal Reserve 
to set “reasonable and proportionate” limits on the fees charged to retailers for debit card 
processing. Small issuers of cards (those with less than $10 billion in assets) are exempt 
from the legislation. The amendment also allows merchants to offer differential discounts 
for different payments methods or different cards (but not for different issuing banks for the 
same card). On the wholesale side, the act resulted in the designation of two of the backbone 
wholesale systems CHIPS and CLS as systemically important payments systems, with
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System as lead regulator in each case. 
On the consumer side, an equally significant source of changes in the regulatory landscape 
came from the slightly earlier “CARD Act’’ of May, 2009, which put additional consumer 
protections on the activities of payment card providers. Among the provisions are 
restrictions on arbitrary rate increases, on manipulations of due dates, and on over-the-
limit fees and procedures. The act requires roll back of penalty rates due to late payment 
after six months of good behavior. The results have not been entirely successful: there is 
evidence that in response issuers have tightened other terms, including introducing annual 
fees and reducing promotions, as well as dropping unprofitable card holders. 
If we want to find recent significant regulatory input into the development of the payment 
system in the US, we need instead to strategic initiatives undertaken by the Federal Reserve. 
This process started in 2012 under the initial direction of the Financial Policy Committee 
(FSPC), a committee composed of three Reserve Bank presidents and two Reserve Bank 
first vice presidents, “responsible for the overall direction of financial services and related 
support functions for the Federal Reserve Banks, as well as for providing Federal Reserve 
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Bank leadership to foster the integrity, efficiency and accessibility of the evolving US 
payment system.” The current status of the project is outlined in the paper “Strategies for 
Improving the US Payment System” describing among other things, a series of task forces 
consisting of representatives of industry and public interests, intended to advise on the 
directions for improving payments services: 
The primary strategies call for (1) sustaining our recently enhanced engagement 
with payment system stakeholders; (2) working with payment stakeholders to 
identify effective approach(es) to implementing a US payments infrastructure 
to support a safe, ubiquitous, faster payments capability that promotes efficient 
commerce, facilitates innovation, reduces fraud and improves public confidence; 
and (3) collaborating with stakeholders to reduce fraud risk and advance the 
safety, security and resiliency of the payment system.9 
In particular, the 331-member Faster Payments Task Force was established in 2015 to 
identify methods to implement improvements to speed, safety and efficiency of Payments 
in the US, including the evaluation of proposed solutions based on 36 effectiveness criteria. 
The four design options to be studied are: 1) an enhancement of the debit card networks,
2) extension from an internet protocol, 3) development of a new real time infrastructure 
while retaining legacy infrastructure for settlement, and 4) development of a new real time 
infrastructure which will also replace existing ACH and check platforms. Proposals will be 
evaluated by the consulting group McKinsey & Company and the plans and evaluations will 
be made available to the task force this year, with the final report anticipated for 2017. 
In all of this, the Federal Reserve is described as a “leader, catalyst for change and provider 
of payment services’’ (report, p. 1). For new non-bank payment systems the regulatory role 
is minimal: such systems are likely to be regulated under separate state-level regulations 
as “licensed money transmitters” and to deal at the federal level primarily in terms of anti-
money laundering and anti-terrorist financing legislation, neither of which is the preserve 
of the Federal Reserve. Even in its role as a provider of payment services, the Federal 
Reserve is sharply circumscribed by the principles outlined in the 1990 policy statement 
(“the Federal Reserve in the Payments System”)10 and which is still regarded as 
determinative: In order to introduce a new service or enhancement on its own, the Federal 
Reserve must meet several criteria, including anticipation of full cost recovery, and of 
inability of other providers to meet the need. 
In the case of the faster payments the policy statement says that the Federal Reserve is 
currently examining “policy issues associated with a possible multi-party environment, such 
as the framework for establishing rules.’’ This preliminary position contrasts somewhat with 
SEPA; the difference probably reflects both the differing speeds of adoption of new payments 
technologies in the two areas, and the difference in relative political power of the regulators 
and the industry. 
Europe’s wholesale systems have been part of the worldwide transition from “Deferred-
Time Net Settlement” (DTNS) systems to “Real-Time Gross Settlement” (RTGS) systems.11 
In a DTNS system a net position of each participating bank is calculated as the sum of 
the value of all the transfers a participant has received up to a particular point in time 
3  Payment systems in 
Europe and the US: 
comparative structure
3.1 WHOLESALE SYSTEMS 
9  Federal Reserve, “Strategies for Improving…” (2015), p. 2.
10  http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/pfs_policies.htm. 
11  Bech and Hobijn (2007).
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minus the value of all transfers it has sent. In a DTNS settlement takes place once a day. 
In the RTGS the settlement is made on a gross basis – payment instructions are 
processed on a one-by-one basis – and the settlement is made on a real-time basis. 
Therefore, RTGS offers advantages compared to DTNS in terms of credit, liquidity and 
systemic risk. 
In the US, the backbone of the wholesale payments system is provided by Fedwire, run 
by the Federal Reserve. While the Fedwire system has been operating as a RTGS since 
1985, several European countries adopted RTGS systems more recently. As the project 
for a single payments evolved during the 1990s, the EU adopted TARGET, a system that 
was created to settle transfer with the creation of the Euro as a single currency. Only 
national RTGS systems were allowed to link to the TARGET system. Not surprisingly, 
adopting an RTGS system became a prerequisite for joining the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). All central banks that planned to introduce the Euro adopted RTGS systems 
before 1997.
Several technical developments followed in the Eurozone, most notably TARGET2, which 
involved moving from a decentralized structure to a centralized structure with a Single 
Shared Platform (SSP). As of 2014, Fedwire had 7866 participants, and TARGET2 had 
2364 participants, of whom 1599 were classified as direct participants. The latest data for 
Fedwire, from the fourth quarter of 2015,12 shows average daily volume of 581,339 
payments, with average value of $3.3 trillion. As of February 2016 (latest data available) 
TARGET2 processed a daily average of 354,263 payments, representing a daily average 
value of €1.9 trillion. In other words every five days each system handles payments 
corresponding approximately to its annual GDP. TARGET2’s share in total large-value 
payment system traffic in euro is 91% in value terms and 61% in volume terms, while the 
remaining is processed by EURO1. As a proportion of large value payment in the US, 
Fedwire is correspondingly less, because of the importance of CHIPS, the interbank 
payments system privately owned by the Clearing House. Fedwire represents 69% of US 
large-value payments traffic in value terms and 55% in volume terms. Charts 1 to 3 provide 
recent comparison of these four large value systems in terms of both value and volume. 
While the demand for the services of large value systems is affected by the demand for 
goods and services in the economy, it is more directly affected by the extent of financial 
transactions in the economy. 
12  https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fedfunds_qtr.htm.
SOURCE: BIS (2015).
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In an RTGS system, funds must be in place before a payment can be effected. In the US an 
institution that satisfies the conditions required is permitted to have daylight overdrafts in 
order to make its payments; these funds are normally paid back by the end of the day. With 
the extraordinarily high availability of liquidity to the banks in recent years, this intraday 
borrowing by participants has declined dramatically, from a peak of more than $70 billion 
on average in the second quarter of 2008, to less than $1.5 billion in recent quarters. 
(https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/psr_dlodavgqtr.htm) This corresponds 
in turn to the large holdings of balances by all banks at the Federal Reserve, which in 
aggregate were on the order of $2.5 trillion in recent quarters – the same order of magnitude 
as daily value moved through Fedwire (see Chart 2). 
In the TARGET2 system, intraday borrowing must be collateralized. The importance of 
intraday borrowing is greater than in Fedwire (however the actual numbers are not comparable 
because of differences in the method of estimating them); and overnight deposits have 
dropped from their unprecedented levels in the wake of the financial crisis (see Table 1). 
In other words, in the relaxed monetary environment currently prevailing, there is little 
incentive for the participants in TARGET2 or Fedwire to attempt any economizing on the 
use of central bank deposits to effect payment. This is in sharp contrast to, for example, 
the extreme level of economizing that occurs in the CLS system, the international system 
for settling large value bilateral foreign exchange transactions.13 
SOURCE: BIS (2015).
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While credit institutions are the most important users of the settlement services of TARGET2, 
access is also given to “non-monetary financial institutions” (non-MFIs). As of 2014 this 
included 52 clearing and settlement organizations. Direct access to Fedwire is restricted for 
the most part to depository institutions, although a handful of “financial market utilities” are 
also allowed accounts. 
Patterns of retail payment vary greatly across the Eurozone, reflecting the different national 
histories of financial institutions and economic development. Nonetheless, some overall 
patterns can be recognized as contrasting with the behavior of retail payment in the US. 
Historically, checks had for many decades been the dominant means of retail payment in 
the US. On the other hand, the fragmented nature of the US banking system and the high 
degree of mobility within the country led to early and widespread adoption of the credit 
card. Meanwhile the expense and inefficiency of the paper check system (entailing as it 
notably did, the costs of transportation, including air transport, for physical presentment) 
led first to the efficiencies of the Check21 program (allowing for check truncation) and to 
other encouragements formal and informal to wean the population from the use of checks. 
The decline in check usage in recent years has been dramatic. 
In many countries in Europe on the other hand, the bank giro has played the analogous 
role to checking in the US. The relatively consolidated nature of the banking system meant 
that credit and debit transfers were of greater importance earlier – and also made the 
transition to electronic banking much more seamless.
Chart 4 (A to D) shows the relative importance of various kinds of retail payments arrangements 
in the US and the Eurozone, measured both by number of transactions and by value of 
transactions. (Because of a change in the methodology of calculating ACH transaction value 
in the US, it is not possible to the extend Chart 4.D back before 2012). In both cases the use 
of checks continues to decline steadily, although from a higher base in the US. In both 
places card payment is growing, although in the Eurozone it is partly eating into the use of 
debit transfers. Note the overwhelming importance of card payments in the US by number 
of transactions, and the overwhelming importance of credit transfers in the Eurozone as 
3.2  NON-CASH RETAIL 
TRANSACTIONS
SOURCE: ECB.
Intra-day loans 
(assets)
Loans other 
than intraday
Overnight
deposits, Euro
823,682878,375942,4544102
313,703866,127348,8943102
883,727975,811,1013,9942102
506,116266,608409,5741102
286,872864,025247,8840102
312,853963,907391,5849002
761,854556,538958,6258002
712,102608,425138,2727002
744,671604,244052,4226002
031,451223,604480,7125002
412,931482,843104,594002
727,331149,772848,153002
338,131708,122695,152002
529,031765,281319,741002
709,811188,052064,540002
SETTLEMENT MEDIA USED BY CREDIT INSTITUTIONS IN THE EUROZONE TABLE 1
€m
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 22 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 30
measured by value. Cards are predominantly used for small value payments as is clear from 
the comparison with the tables based on value. When we measure by volume, the dramatic 
decline in the use of checks in the US mirrors the increase in the use of cards (in particular, 
as we shall see, the use of debit cards) as a replacement for small value purchases. However 
in the measures based on total value, of purchase, the decline in checks is mirrored by the 
increased use of credit transfers, whose growth in the US has been steady for use in payroll 
and other business payment. 
Cards penetrate much more deeply in the US than in the Eurozone and the credit function 
of cards is of much greater importance in the US. Chart 8 compares number of cards in 
Europe and the US, and Chart 9 shows the relative importance of the value of transactions 
with credit and debit cards as a percentage of GDP. The total number of payment cards in 
the Eurozone grew from 311 million in 2000 to 551 million in 2014. In the Eurozone the 
number of credit cards outstanding has shrunk in recent years, but the number of debit 
cards has grown quickly, to the point where there is approximately one debit card per 
person and 0.4 credit cards per person.14 In the US the number of debit cards increased 
14  These calculations are based on the data from the ECB.
SOURCES: ECB, BIS and authors’ elaboration.
a Resident payment system providers only.
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by 10% from 2010 to 2014, and the number of credit cards increased by 7%; there is now 
approximately 1 debit card and nearly 3 credit cards per person. The relative importance 
is also reflected in the use of the two kinds of cards; although in both cases credit cards 
are used for higher value transactions than non-credit cards. 
Security is also an important concern with card payments in both the US and the Eurozone. 
Losses related to card fraud are substantial. In Europe, the total value of fraudulent transactions 
conducted using cards issued within SEPA and acquired worldwide amounted to €1.44 billion 
in 2013, which represented an increase of 8% from 2012 [European Central Bank (2015)]. 
In the US in 2012, the estimate of losses on general purpose cards from unauthorized 
transactions (“third-party fraud”) was $4.1 billion. On the one hand, these figures, while 
large, represent less than one-tenth of one percent of transactions. On the other hand, the 
rate of unauthorized transactions for cards in the US is much higher than for ACH or for 
checks [Federal Reserve System (2014)]. 
Most dramatic is the difference between the use of e-money transaction cards; the number 
and value of these cards in the US is negligible. In the Eurozone, Cards with an e-money 
functionality have risen from 110 in 2000 to 179 million in 2014.
TOTAL NUMBER OF PAYMENTS CARDS CHART 8
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1,000
41023102210211020102
 US: CREDIT  EUROZONE: DEBIT (a)  US: DEBIT  EUROZONE: CREDIT  EUROZONE: E-MONEY
Millions
SOURCES: BIS and authors’ elaboration.
a Eurozone Debit consists of all payments cards less those with a credit function.
VALUE OF CARD PAYMENT AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP CHART 9
SOURCE: Federal Reserve, ECB, BIS and authors’ elaboration.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
 CREDIT  DEBIT
%
A  EUROZONE
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
 CREDIT
%
B UNITED STATES
 DEBIT
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 24 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 30
Since SEPA integrates both credit institutions and other providers of payments services 
into a single system, it is easier in the Eurozone to begin to understand the relative 
importance of the various kinds of providers of payments services. In particular in 2014 
there were 6,070 institutions in the Euroarea offering payments sevices, down from more 
than 7,000 in 2000, as a result of consolidation across the Eurozone. Most of these were 
credit institutions. However, the number of electronic money institutions increased from 13 
in 2005 to 51 in 2014, and the number of payments institutions increased from 66 in 2000 
to 323 in 2012, and the category of “other payment service providers” increased from 12 
in 2010 to 512 in 2014 (these jumps are explained to a large extent by the change in the 
denomination of these institutions due to SEPA). And although by any measure the credit 
institutions activities dominate, the activities of institutions that are not credit institutions 
have grown rapidly. This illustrates the recent emergence of these institutions as well as 
the impact of the creation of a legal framework within SEPA.
For obvious reasons, it is much more difficult to obtain information on the prevalence of 
cash transactions. A variety of recent studies have attempted to derive conclusions from 
the use of diary information, and some cross-country comparisons of payments behavior 
are beginning to be derived from them. In this section however we will confine ourselves 
to indirect comparisons based on aggregate data. 
At the end of 2014, banknotes and coins issued and held outside of banks were about 
$3,900 per person in the US, and about €2,900 per person in the Eurozone (Chart 10). 
Clearly part of this circulated outside of the area in each case, and part was being held as 
savings rather than for transactions. Thus a clearer comparison might arise from examining 
per capita holdings at smaller denominations.
At almost all levels the per capita issue of banknotes and coins is greater for dollars than 
it is for Euros (the one exception comes from the prevalence of €50 notes relative to $50 
bills) for example in denominations of €10 or less, the ECB has issued €165 worth of cash 
per capita, while in denominations of $10 or less the Federal Reserve has issued $280 
(=€207 at an exchange rate of 1.35) worth of cash per capita. This consistent difference 
implies a somewhat higher demand for cash geared to small value transactions in the US 
than in the Eurozone.
This difference is also consistent with the difference in ATM availability in the two areas: In the 
Eurozone, ATMs have increased to 361,229 in 2014 from 198,994 in 2000 (an accumulated 
3.3 CASH TRANSACTIONS
PER CAPITA ISSUE OF BANKNOTES AND COIN, CUMULATIVE BY DENOMINATION, 2014 CHART 10
SOURCE: BIS and authors’ elaboration.
1
10
100
1,000
10,000
1 2 5 10 20 50 100 200 500
 EUR  USD
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 25 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 30
81.5% growth, see Table 2). Detailed information on ATM numbers in the US is not readily 
available, but a consulting firm estimated 420,000 machines in the US in 200915 (corresponding 
figures for the Eurozone were approximately 320,000).
In the Eurozone, the number of withdrawals at ATMs has grown by 8.7% and the total value 
of withdrawals by 9.5% over the four years 2010-2014. The number of withdrawals amounts 
to around 24 per person per year, with the average withdrawal on the order of €125. 
In the US, the number of ATM withdrawals declined between 2009 and 2012 by about 3%, 
with around 58 withdrawals per person made in 2012. The total value of withdrawals from 
ATMs over the four years rose by about 6% with the average size of a withdrawal in 2012 
being about $118.
While this set of facts might be taken as indirect evidence of somewhat greater, but 
decreasing dependency on cash in the US than in the Eurozone, care must be taken in 
reaching such a conclusion. The Federal Reserve’s 2013 payments study notes that while 
the number of withdrawals from ATM machines in the US was twice as great as the number 
of cash withdrawals over-the-counter at bank branches, over-the-counter withdrawals 
averaged $715 each.16 Thus a complete comparison would require surveying consumer 
behavior within banks in the Eurozone as well
A final indirect source of evidence about the importance of cash in transactions comes from 
the data on the proportion of unbanked individuals in the two locations. According to the 
study by the World Bank, 6% of adults in the US did not possess a bank account in 201417; 
SOURCES: ECB and authors’ elaboration.
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15  http://www.cutimes.com/2014/07/28/3-million-atms-worldwide-by-2015-atm-association.
16  Federal Reserve System (2014).
17  Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2015). A survey by the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“2013 FDIC National 
Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households”) comes up with a similar figure, estimating that 7.7% of 
households in the United States were unbanked in 2013.
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in the Eurozone countries, the range was from a high of 23% in Slovakia, and 13% in Italy and 
Portugal to 0% in Denmark and Finland; a weighted average by population yields an estimate 
of 5%. It is likely that a country by country detailed comparison would yield a correlation 
between prevalence of unbanked households and the prevalence of the use of cash.
In this section we examine three challenges faced by payments systems and the current 
performance of the system and or regulator to those challenges. First we look at the question 
of operational risk in the wholesale system. Then we examine two related changes in the retail 
system, the rise of fintech alternatives and the attempt to move away from cash payments. 
The performance of payments systems in the US and the Eurozone documents their 
extreme safety and resilience, even in periods of economic turmoil such as the recent 
financial crisis. Even so, it is worthwhile to consider the cases of system failure, if for no 
other reason than that the potential costs are so great. 
The Annual Reports of the TARGET system provide some information on the number and 
type of system failures. Chart 11 provides a summary, hand-collected from the reports 
since 2001. Prior to that date, earlier reports mentioned some particular incidents – for 
example, “a few serious incidents occurred in TARGET, mainly in 1999, when local TARGET 
components were not fully operational for several hours. In these rare cases, mainly in 
order to avoid end-of-day liquidity imbalances within TARGET, TARGET closing time was 
delayed accordingly.” In the early 2000s, the number of failures was still high. At that time, 
the two main causes of incidents in TARGET were problems in the system’s connection to 
the SWIFT network and software/hardware component failures.
Chart 11 also shows a learning effect with a dramatic fall in the number of failures during 
the 2000s (The apparent increase from 2002 to 2003 is due to a change in reporting method). 
By the mid-2000s, the main identified cause of incidents was software component failures. 
The migration to TARGET2 was an important turning point in reducing technical failures. By 
2009, failures were reduced to a minimum and were mainly due to isolated problems of 
network components. These incidents only partly affected the processing of transactions 
and did not cause any unavailability of TARGET2.
It is worth mentioning, however, a problem on 25 July 2011 that, according to that year 
TARGET report represented “the most serious TARGET2 incident in 2011 and, to a certain 
extent, since its launch in 2007 […] The payment module could not be updated to the right 
4  Payment systems in 
Europe and the US: 
Consequences
4.1  FAILURES IN THE 
WHOLESALE SYSTEM
INCIDENTS IN THE TARGET SYSTEM CHART 11
SOURCES: ECB (TARGET annual reports) and authors’ elaboration.
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status to start the day-trade phase. Technical investigations showed that the problem 
would still exist in case of a failover to another site or even region. As a consequence, for 
the first time in a real contingency situation – the contingency module was activated […]. 
This module allows the national service desks at each central bank to manually input, on 
behalf of their users, payments which are considered as very critical or critical.”
As a more mature system, with a less complicated topology, Fedwire has worried less 
about operational difficulty.18 However, the terrorist attacks of Tuesday, September 11, 
2001, constituted an extraordinary operational challenge to the entire financial system 
in the US, but in particular to the large value payments systems. As documented in 
McAndrews and Potter (2002), settlements continued to occur on Fedwire and in CHIPS 
on September 11 and subsequent days, although volumes on Fedwire were down more 
than 40% from the previous day, and remained somewhat low for the succeeding two 
days. (Value of Fedwire payments on the other hand returned to normal on September 
12, and remained elevated for the following days). While some individual banks suffered 
physical disruptions, the decision by the Federal Reserve to inject large amounts of 
liquidity into the system meant that the effects were minimized for the system as a whole. 
The large injections meant that turnover ratios (total payments divided by deposits) fell 
from more than 100 before September 11 to 18 on September 14 [McAndrews and 
Potter (2002), p. 64]. 
The experience also emphasizes the importance of the interrelation between participants 
in an RTGS system. Even at the extreme levels of liquidity observed currently, the typical 
amount of payment by a participant greatly exceeds the available overnight deposits. Thus 
the timing of payments by participants will depend not only on the availability of funds, but 
on the expectations that counterparties will recycle the liquidity by provide payments 
promptly. McAndrews and Potter provide evidence of the disruption of this “reaction 
function” during the aftermath of the attacks, explaining the decreased turnover ratio and 
necessitating the additional liquidity.
Although the backbone of Fedwire is thus extremely resilient, it contains a large number of 
participants of varying sizes. Thus there are noticeable effects on the system from 
operational outages at the participant level. Klee (2007) examines the effect of outages 
(measured by unexpected intraday gaps in participation in Fedwire by individual depository 
institutions) and shows that some individual outages may slightly increase the federal 
funds rate and its volatility, as well the amount of borrowing by participants at the discount 
window. In particular, outages later in the day or outages associated with extensions of the 
settlement time by Fedwire (which can be done if in Fedwire’s estimation, there is a 
significant disruption in payments as a result of the problems of an individual bank), have 
small but significant effects on these variables. 
International financial supervision institutions are expressing their concerns about financial 
innovations – including payment instruments – related to new technologies, the so-called 
‘fintech.’ Although the effects of fintech are still small at the moment, this will soon change. 
In the Eurozone, e-money and “other methods of payment” are a small but growing fraction 
of the number of transactions (see Chart 4.A); in the US the systems are growing rapidly as 
well, although they are still negligible in comparison to traditional payments methods.
4.2  THE CASE OF FINTECH 
AND FINANCIAL STABILITY
18  Fedwire operating hours can be extended for one of two reasons: if there is a failure of Reserve Bank equipment, 
or if there is an operating problem at a third party yielding more than $1 billion worth of payments delay. [Federal 
Reserve Bank Operating Circular 6, effective August 1, 2004, p. 7, cited in Klee (2007) p. 7]. Almost all extensions 
are associated with third-party transfers.
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According to the statistics portal Statista, the total value of investment in fintech globally 
reached approximately $6.8 billion in 2014.19 Other sources point at an even larger 
investment. The Economist, for example, suggests fintech investment reached €12 billion 
in 2015, 9 billion corresponding to the US and 3 billion elsewhere.20 Statista estimates that 
28% of the fintech investment in the world in 2013 was devoted to payment instruments, 
with another 29% to banking and corporate finance.21 
Of particular concern is the entry of non-financial firms into the payments arena. The growth 
of non-traditional electronic payments such as mobile or contactless highlights the linkage 
between payment system innovations and financial stability. Services such as those promoted 
by ApplePay, SamsungPay or other non-bank payments service providers may evolve rapidly, 
and the lack of a typical bank structure requires a special treatment. 
The challenge is to ensure a level playing field between bank and non-bank providers, as 
well as an adequate level of control and supervision over them. In the G-20 meeting of 
February 29, 2016, the governor of the Bank of England and head of the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB), Mark Carney, described the challenge:
The regulatory framework must ensure that it is able to manage any systemic 
risks that may arise from technological change without stifling innovation.
The FSB is evaluating the potential financial stability implications of emerging 
financial technology innovation for the financial system as a whole, working 
with standard setters that are monitoring developments in their respective 
sectors. We are also working to understand better the potential impacts on 
financial stability of operational disruption to core financial institutions or
infrastructure.22
Dermine (2016) notes there is a need to assess the threat posed by digital banking as 
seen in the context of a long series of innovations in the banking sector that includes 
telephone banking, payment cards, the development of capital markets, internet, 
smartphones, and cloud computing. In particular, it raises public policy issues: its impact 
on the profitability and solvency of banks, the protection of borrowers and investors, and 
the systemic importance of the new players, the fintechs starts-up specialized in financial 
services.
It is in their responses to the fintech revolution that the regulatory systems of the Eurozone 
and the US differ most notably. The US has not provided a roadmap; the Eurozone somehow 
has, through the PSD2. The principles in the Eurozone are clearly stated by PSD2: 
“equivalent operating conditions should be guaranteed, to existing and new players on 
the market, enabling new means of payment to reach a broader market, and ensuring a 
high level of consumer protection in the use of those payment services across the Union 
as a whole.” What remains unclear, of course, is the meaning of “equivalent operating 
conditions” – in particular, 1) what constitutes “equivalent” regulatory requirements for 
old and new players and 2) what forms of access will old players be required to provide 
to new players?
19  http://www.statista.com/statistics/376891/value-of-global-fintech-investment-areas/.
20  The Economist (May 9, 2015): http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21650546-wave-startups-changing-
financefor-better-fintech-revolution.
21  http://www.statista.com/statistics/376666/global-fintech-investment-areas/ . Other investments included (29%), 
data analysis (19%), capital markets (10%) and personal finance (14%).
22  See this piece in Financial Times (February 27, 2016) for reference: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d6813cba-
dd55-11e5-b072-006d8d362ba3.html#axzz41TmIDFCq.
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With regard to the first of these questions, the PSD2 opens the single standard for all 
providers of payments services which do not themselves take deposits or issue electronic 
money up to the payment initiation services providers and the account information services 
providers. The crucial question is how tight the standard should be. As noted by Verdier 
and Mariotto (2015), the trade-off between financial stability and competition is key to 
payment innovations. They suggest that creating new licenses for non-banks is not the only 
regulatory option to enhance competition in retail banking markets.23 Among the innovations 
put forward by the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority is the idea of a “regulatory sandbox,” 
a “‘safe space’ in which businesses can test innovative products, services, business 
models and delivery mechanisms without immediately incurring all the normal regulatory 
consequences of engaging in the activity in question.” [FCA (2015), p. 2]. By allowing the 
introduction of new payments arrangements on a small scale the regulatory structure 
enables both the business and the regulator the opportunity to begin to understand the 
risks and benefits from the innovation. 
With regard to the second of the questions, while PSD2 lays out general principles for 
equitable access (which will lastly be concreted by the European Banking Authority), the 
effective implementation of these will ultimately be the responsibility of national regulators. 
In the interim, there is a transition period when some suppliers of these services are not 
still fully regulated or treated on par with credit institutions. National Competent Authorities 
are expected to supervise new providers and, at the same time, guarantee fair competition 
in that market avoiding unjustifiable discrimination against any existing player. In order to 
make this monitoring as transparent as possible, the EBA is expected, inter alia, to ensure 
easy public access to the lists of the entities providing payment services and operate a 
central register for each category of payment service providers in which it publishes the 
names of the entities providing such services. 
The importance of the question of access and the rules for it cannot be overstated. Rules for 
access will determine both the pace of innovation and the ultimate structure of the payments 
industry.24 Boot (2016) suggests that online platforms could offer a supermarket type model 
facilitating access to various products and services of disparate providers along with record 
keeping. He refers to firm such as Google, Facebook, Amazon or Apple making use of 
payments solutions such as ApplePay as a platform to gain direct customer interface for 
related products and services. This implies that legacy financial institutions then might be 
relegated to serving as the back office to the platform. As Verdier and Mariotto (2015) note, 
when the regulator intends to set rules that aim at enhancing customer protection, they may 
impede entrants from accessing banks’ existing infrastructure to offer innovative services.
Cash is expensive. One recent study [Chakravorti and Mazzotta (2013)] estimates that cash 
alone imposes total costs of $43 billion a year to US households, and $55 billion per year to 
US firms. The prime source of costs to households in this estimate is the time spent obtaining 
cash (trips to the bank or ATM); the prime source of costs to firms is the losses associated 
with retail theft. While fees associated with cash are a small part of customer costs, individuals 
without bank accounts were estimated to pay $3.66 per month more for cash than those with 
bank accounts.25 
4.3  MAIN REMAINING 
CHALLENGES IN THE 
TRANSITION FROM CASH 
TO ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS
23  Some countries have even decided to reduce capital requirements for new competitors getting a bank license. 
This is the case of the Financial Service Authority (FSA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) in the 
United Kingdom, which decided to reduce capital requirements at authorization in 2013.
24  For more detailed examination of these issues see Kahn (2016).
25  Using a different methodology, Denecker et al. (2013) estimate that cash cost the US 0.47% of GDP between 
2007-2011, or $490 per household, and the European Union 0.45% of GDP or $350 per household.
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Cash transactions provide greater privacy than is obtainable through other payments 
media.26 Privacy can be legitimate benefit27 and so cash can provide a socially useful 
function in the portfolio of payments options. Nonetheless, most studies focus on the 
costs from privacy associated with cash transactions, in the form of criminal activity and 
tax evasion. The Chakravorti and Mazzotta study puts these costs at $100 billion annually. 
Because of these costs, many observers have advocated moving away from cash. The most 
strident recommendations have been for elimination of high denomination notes, on the 
grounds that these are overwhelmingly used for illegal activity [see, for example, Sands (2016)]. 
In the US, the last instance in which bills were eliminated was in 1969, when the $500 and 
higher bills were withdrawn from circulation. The ECB has just announced the phase out of 
the €500 note; current recommendations are for withdrawal of the $100 bill in the US. In 
addition, various countries within the Eurozone have made cash transactions above a certain 
level illegal (for example in Spain the limit is €2,500). In the US, large value cash transactions 
will come under banks’ reporting requirements under anti money laundering regulation.
More generally, an attempt to move an economy away from cash requires both a “push” 
(discouraging cash transactions) and a “pull” (improving the alternatives to cash transactions). 
For small denomination retail transactions, the alternatives are either the established card-
based technologies or new fintech solutions such as mobile platforms. As we have seen, 
the new technologies, while growing rapidly are still a minor part of the payments 
landscape in both the US and the Eurozone. Even if the PSD2 represents an explicit 
acknowledgement of the emergence and growing relevance of non-cash payments, the 
focus in Europe is still on cards, and so for the immediate future, the significant 
replacement for cash is likely to be card based. 
As we have documented earlier on, while credit and debit transfers have been almost fully 
integrated in Europe, substantial efforts are still need to progress towards a single card 
payments area. Technical problems are some of the remaining issues in Europe that 
impede a greater payment card adoption. For example, some cards which are SEPA-
compliant, are not accepted in some countries. Considering the advances in solving 
pricing problems related to interchange fees,28 consumers and merchants should probably 
find some of these technical problems as significant constraints. Competition between 
local and foreign acquirers may have a say on these problems. 
The ECB itself considers that “internationally active retailers face difficulties with different 
business practices and rules within SEPA, as well as different functional and security 
requirements for their payment terminals. Acquirers are sometimes bound by restrictive 
membership or licensing rules in the card schemes. At the level of the processing of card 
transactions, several restrictions still prevail. This shows that there is still much to do to 
achieve the objective of SEPA for cards.” [European Central Bank (2014)].
In contrast, while the card systems are mature and stable in the US, the process of 
integrating alternative platforms seamlessly into the payments system is, as we have 
seen, much less advanced. Which of the two systems is better positioned for the 
replacement of cash might therefore depend on the extent to which non-traditional 
platforms begin to dominate the payments landscape. However it should be kept in mind 
26  As some users have discovered, to their chagrin, in some circumstances even Bitcoin is not as private an instrument 
as cash.
27  See, for example, Kahn et al. (2005).
28  See Carbó-Valverde et al. (2016).
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that included in the Fintech revolution are a host of technologies which, despite their 
innovative shells – whether mobile, contactless or virtual – still the payment card 
infrastructure underneath. 
This paper has surveyed the main recent developments and prospects in payments 
systems in Europe and the US. The size and importance of these systems make their 
efficiency and stability of crucial concern to policymakers. We have compared patterns of 
usage and differences in regulatory landscape in the Eurozone and the US at retail and 
wholesale level. In particular we have compared the initial reactions to current innovations 
in financial technology and the challenge of non-financial institutions entering the payments 
arena. 
A key theme has been the effect of the regulatory framework on changes in the payment 
system. In Europe, the quest for common schemes and continent wide standardization has 
defined the regulatory landscape for payments in the past decade. In the US on the other 
hand, where existing platforms already benefit from standardization, the challenge has come 
from limitations on the ability of regulators to enforce unified solutions on emerging technologies. 
At the wholesale level, Fedwire and TARGET2 operate at comparable scales. In the relaxed 
monetary environment currently prevailing, in neither system have participants felt the need 
to economize on the use of central bank liquidity to effect payment. Instead, concerns 
about safety of wholesale system center on the potential for systemic instability. The move 
of Europe’s system to Real-Time Gross Settlement was an important step in protecting the 
system from systemic risk, and further improvements have occurred as the centralized 
structure of TARGET2 has matured, with sharp decreases in the number of system failures. 
As a simpler system and more established system Fedwire has had fewer concerns about 
operational safety. However, since it contains a large number of participants of varying 
sizes, there are detectable effects on the system from failures at the participant level.
At the retail level the usage of different payments modes differed historically but appears to 
be converging. The dependence of the US on checks is largely disappearing; the use of 
payment cards in the Eurozone is increasing rapidly. Differences persist, as in the preference 
for credit cards in the US and debit cards on average in the Eurozone. The growth of card 
usage in the Eurozone is matched by growth in losses from card fraud. Similarly, the rate of 
unauthorized transactions for cards in the US is much higher than for ACH or for checks.
In Europe, converging to electronic payment standards and creating a single market for 
payments under SEPA is expected to generate significant cost savings for all market 
participants. Nonetheless, at present there remains substantial work to be done to make 
progress towards a single card area, although credit and debit transfers have been almost 
fully integrated. In the US on the other hand, with a single card area already in place, there 
has not been an overarching program for regulating the retail payments system; instead 
legislation has largely been confined to consumer protection against particular practices 
by payment card providers.
Probably the most effective way of decreasing the overall cost of a retail payments system 
is to reduce its reliance on cash. Use of cash is probably slightly greater in the US, although 
declining, and the attempts to limit its use are probably somewhat more aggressive in 
Europe. On the other hand, since cards are most likely to be the primary replacement for 
cash in the foreseeable future, the single card area in the US puts it at an advantage in the 
immediate transition. 
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In the longer run, however, the US may find itself not as well positioned. PSD2, which 
deals specifically with electronic payments and non-bank payments providers, provides 
a clear framework for the development in Europe of integrated fintech platforms for 
payment. The framework places it well ahead of the comparable initiatives in the US. The 
documented growth in users of e-moneys and providers of alternative payments services, 
illustrate the impact of the SEPA legal framework. 
Questions remain as to whether the introduction of the new players will lead to new 
instabilities in the payments system. Maintaining the proper degrees of efficiency and 
safety is a difficult balancing act: should regulation of the new providers be comparable to 
that of bank or would a “lighter touch” (reduced capital requirements, regulatory sandboxes) 
be appropriate? Can the goal of guaranteeing fair competition between old and new 
providers can be met under the proposed standards? With the fundamental uncertainties 
about the ultimate organizational structure of the payment system after the fintech 
revolution, these questions will remain at the forefront. 
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